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FORWARD DEPLOYED HOMELAND DEFENSE: RETHINKING THEATER ENGAGEMENT IN
THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER ELEVENTH

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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04 FEBRUARY 2002

Abstract

The events of September 11th are a wake-up call for American security strategy to the realities of a changing global security environment. The ongoing war on terror and efforts to improve homeland defense have emerged as the fundamental policy initiatives by which the United States means to combat the terrorist threat. However, while these initiatives are critical and have already met with some success, a third element that can contribute to a comprehensive strategy against terror, CINC managed theater engagement, has received less consideration in this context. The offensive strategy of the war, and aggressive homeland security measures, can be complemented by rethinking CINC theater strategies toward a full spectrum of engagement, focusing specifically on countering terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while still meeting other strategic engagement objectives. This paper offers a conceptual framework for rethinking Theater Engagement Strategies in the wake of September 11th, and presents practical recommendations for implementing the framework to support execution in the current global security environment.

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Introduction: The “Acme of Skill”

"To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."

- Sun Tzu

The events of September 11th are a wake-up call for American security strategy to the realities of a changing global security environment. They demonstrate the inefficacy of American anti- and counter- terrorist policies as they have been executed for the last fifteen to twenty years.¹ The ongoing war on terror and efforts to improve homeland defense have emerged as the fundamental policy initiatives by which the United States means to combat the terrorist threat. However, while these initiatives are critical and have already met with some success, a third element that can contribute to a comprehensive strategy against terror, CINC managed theater engagement, has received less consideration in this context. The offensive strategy of the war, and aggressive homeland security measures, can be complemented by rethinking CINC theater strategies toward a full spectrum of engagement, focusing specifically on countering terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while still meeting other strategic engagement objectives. The existing process for Theater Engagement Planning can be leveraged to support an active forward defense, with the goal of *subduing the enemy without a fight*.

This paper describes the national strategic basis for engagement that existed prior to September 11th. It examines how engagement strategy has, and has not, been affected by the change in the global security environment, catalyzed by the events of September 11th, and proposes corresponding changes in thinking about theater engagement. Finally, it discusses the practical impact of this strategic paradigm on determination of Prioritized Regional Objectives

¹ McCaffery, Barry, “Challenges to U.S. National Security: Dealing with Madness,” *Armed Forces Journal International*, October, 2001: 6.

and the increased relevance of inter-agency coordination in the Theater Engagement Strategy and Planning process.

The National Strategy: U. S. Hegemony and “The Imperative of Engagement”²

The decade of the 1990’s saw significant changes in the global security environment that included the end of the Cold War, fallout of globalization, the information revolution and the emergence of United States’ global hegemony. These factors contributed to a great transformation in American National Security and Military Strategy that is ongoing and is characterized by an “imperative of engagement”.³

The National Military Strategy, dating from 1997, states that the strategic environment is uncertain.⁴ It outlines a “Shaping” role for the United States Military that is intended to leverage forward engagement to create conditions favorable to national interests and global security.⁵ Additionally, it asserts that the security environment would be more threatening without American engagement.⁶ The National Security Strategy, last revised in December 2000 as *A National Security for a Global Age*, amplifies this approach, asserting that the strategy for engagement enables achievement of the most fundamental goals of enhancing security, and promoting prosperity, democracy and human rights.⁷ Political platitudes aside, the text of these documents is clear in outlining an imperative for United States forward engagement with all the elements of power in support of American national interests.

² Benson, Stephen, “Formative and Operative Engagement,” *Globalization and National Security* [CD-ROM] (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University), 2001.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C., 1997), 1.

⁵ Ibid., 11.

⁶ Ibid., 1.

⁷ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), 5.

It is in this strategic context that the Theater Engagement Strategy and Planning process was created, and that the existing Theater Engagement Plans (TEP's) were derived. The process was first implemented in 1997 to ensure adequate linkage between CINC-planned regional engagement activities and national objectives,⁸ owing presumably to the increased emphasis placed on engagement in the national strategic guidance. While the process has been criticized for its inability to provide a mechanism to tie resourcing and acquisition to engagement strategy,⁹ it remains the principal process for integrating the CINC's regional strategy at the national level.

On the tenth of September therefore, forward engagement was already an integral element of the nation's security and military strategies, with a process in place to integrate regional engagement strategies into a "global family of plans"¹⁰ that support national level objectives. One day later, America began a strategic reassessment due to a national tragedy that changed the security environment. Theater engagement strategies must be a part of that reassessment.

Impact of September 11th on Theater Engagement Strategy

On the eleventh of September, two thousand and one, radical Islamic terrorists hijacked four passenger aircraft and flew three of them into the seats of American economic and military power, killing thousands of innocent United States' citizens. In the aftermath of these atrocities, amid the clamor for a more secure and well defended homeland, the symbolic nature of the targets of the world's radical fringe, one economic and one military, should not go unnoticed.

⁸Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning (CJCSM 3113.01A)*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), A-1.

⁹Jordan, Lovelace, Young, *"Shaping" the World Through "Engagement": Assessing the Department of Defense's Theater Engagement Planning Process*, (Newport, R.I.: United States Naval War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2000)

¹⁰Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning (CJCSM 3113.01A)*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), A-1.

The two are inextricably tied, suggesting little irony in the terrorist's target selection. The national strategic guidance states that, in the global age, homeland and international security rely heavily on the stability of the geo-economy, of which the United States is a primary engine, and a forward engaged United States military is its protector. The National Security and Military Strategies invoke forward-deployed forces as a cornerstone of enhanced security at home and abroad.¹¹ The liberal use of the words abroad, global, international, and engaged underscore the importance that these most seminal strategic documents attribute to global military engagement.¹² As America conducts a strategic reassessment in the wake of these events, determining what has and has not changed, the terrorists' target selection is a data point worth noting. It highlights the sources of American power.

What Has Not Changed: The Engagement Imperative Remains

While some bemoan that September 11th "changed everything", the engagement imperative in *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age* is not obviated by these events. And although the draft version of the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy that was being prepared for publication on September 10th has yet to be released, the public commentary of administration officials suggests that engagement will remain a cornerstone of the new strategy. In his inaugural address President Bush noted that "the enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom."¹³ Secretary of State Powell, in his opening statement

¹¹ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), 9.

¹² Benson, Stephen, "Formative and Operative Engagement," *Globalization and National Security* [CD-ROM] (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University), 2001.

¹³ Department of State, "U.S. National Security: The Bush Team" Department of State Online. Available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0301/ijpe/ijpe0301.htm>; accessed 15 January 2001.

before the House International Relations Committee, stated that we must “use the power that we have ... to remain engaged in the world.”¹⁴

The engagement imperative remains because the rationale behind forward military engagement, which has its roots in globalization and American hegemony, remains valid despite the events of September 11th. Economic globalization has placed the United States at the head of an informal empire of free-trade¹⁵ that represents over thirty percent of our Gross Domestic Product¹⁶, and upon which we and many of our allies rely for our prosperity. Additionally, it brings with it a burden of leadership to provide the hegemonic stability¹⁷ that preserves the conditions in which we thrive. The global economy mandates military engagement in peacetime as the manifestation of United States hegemony that preserves the international conditions favorable to our prosperity, and that of our allies. Abdication of this responsibility could lead to international instability, a decline in global free-trade, and the domestic chaos associated with economic collapse.

The concept of hegemonic stability is supported by clear empirical evidence in recent history. During the nineteenth century *Pax Britannia*, in which Great Britain exercised near global hegemony largely through unrivaled sea power, economic openness and free-trade had reached levels previously unseen. However, as British hegemony declined in the early twentieth century, two devastating World Wars and global depression ensued.¹⁸ Indeed, although we cannot be certain of the answer, we must ask ourselves whether today’s world economy would

¹⁴ Department of State, “U.S. International Engagement: A Time of Great Opportunity, A Summary of Statements by Secretary of State Colin Powell on key Foreign Policy Issues” Department of State Online. Available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0301/ijpe/pj61powe.htm>; accessed 15 January 2001.

¹⁵ Dorman, Smith, Uttley, eds., *The Changing Face of Maritime Power* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 18.

¹⁶ Flanagan, Stephen, Frost, Ellen, Kugler, Richard, “Challenges of the Global Century: Report of the Project on Globalization and National Security,” Washington, D.C., Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2001, 7.

¹⁷ *Strategy and Force Planning*. (Newport: Naval War College Press, [2000]), 237-238.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 238.

have survived September 11th if United States military forces had not been forward deployed, globally engaged and ready to respond quickly and credibly to the imminent threat of global-reach terrorism. The decline of global markets through the month of September, and their sudden rebound after decisive United States military action, offers evidence of this stabilizing force. Table 1 shows the closing averages of major stock markets before the attacks, after the attacks and after the United States forcible intervention in Afghanistan.

Table 1. Closing Averages of Major Stock Markets (Figures approximate)¹⁹

Stock Market	10September 2001	30September 2001	30October 2001
DJIA (USA)	9600	8500	9500
FTSE (England)	5400	4400	5200
DAX (Germany)	5000	3800	4800
NIKKEI (Japan)	10500	9500	10800

While the legitimacy of the threat of global-reach terrorism has altered the security environment, it has not fundamentally changed geopolitics to the extent that American hegemony is no longer a source of global stability.

What Has Changed: Homeland Defense and Theater Engagement

As American hegemony remains a source of global stability, the national guidance to the CINC's regarding engagement posture will likely continue to mandate robust military engagement. However, the events of last fall and the ongoing campaign against trans-national terror, suggest a change in the strategic basis for theater military engagement. The vital national interest of homeland defense has become an acute priority in the altered security environment. Nonetheless, the homeland will not be optimally secured by merely increasing the size of our border patrol to 40,000 men and women.²⁰ Nor will our homeland be secured simply by casting

¹⁹ NASDAQ Stock Market, "Global Trends: 12 Month History Chart" NASDAQ Online. Available from <http://dynamic.international.nasdaq.com/asp/globalmarkets.asp>; accessed 15 January 2001.

²⁰ McCaffery, Barry, "Challenges to U.S. National Security: Dealing with Madness," *Armed Forces Journal International*, October, 2001: 7.

more naval assets in coastal patrol roles. While these initiatives are justifiable, they constitute elements of a defensive strategy, and do not interdict the threat at its origin. In addition to these measures, a more active defense can be mounted by leveraging our forward engagement posture in support of the homeland defense mission, while continuing to engage in ways that support our other vital national interests.

An examination of the United States policy on terrorism illustrates this point, and demonstrates that engagement can support homeland defense pro-actively. There are four tenets of current United States' counter-terrorist policy. They comprise,

- Make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals
- Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes
- Isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior
- Bolster the counter-terrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance²¹

Isolating state sponsors and bolstering the counter-terrorism capabilities of our allies are policy statements that can be directly affected by theater military engagement. Accomplishing this goal requires recasting the conceptual basis of our Theater Engagement Strategies from the existing guidance in the national security and military strategies to one that better suits the altered security environment. Specifically, the scope of our strategy should increase to address all vital national interests, while prioritizing regional objectives that support pro-active homeland defense.

²¹ Pillar, Paul R., *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 8.

Implications for Theater Strategy: Toward "Full Spectrum Engagement"

The Engagement Spectrum and Threats Versus Opportunities

The guidance for existing Theater Engagement Strategic Concepts evolved from *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age* (December 2000) and the National Military Strategy of 1997. It was delineated in the most recent Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans(JSCP). All four of these strategic documents pre-dated September 11th. In general, it can be said that these documents were focused on the opportunities presented by the global security environment. Indeed, President Clinton characterized this view in his preface to *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*,

*"America today has power and authority never seen before in the history of the world. We must continue to use it, in partnership with those who share our values, to seize the opportunities to meet the challenges of a global age (emphasis added)."*²²

On the other hand, the national security strategy does not even refer to terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in its section entitled "Shaping the International Environment". Rather, these issues are dealt with in the "Responding to Threats and Crises" section.²³ Here is clear evidence that the strategic guidance is opportunity based, and sees terrorism and weapons proliferation as threats to which we will "respond" rather than preempt.

While opportunities remain, September's events no longer allow the luxury of treating terrorism and WMD proliferation as aberrations in an otherwise opportunity rich security environment. They evidence the threat of global reach terrorism to be far more menacing than assessed at the time the guidance was drafted. No doubt, the global security environment has changed. The credibility of the threat mandates a full spectrum of engagement activities that not

²² The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), iv.

²³ Ibid., 2-3.

only leverages opportunities, but also pro-actively addresses homeland security through forward engagement.

Defining the Engagement Spectrum

A recent RAND Corporation study criticized the CJCS TEP Manual's (CJCSM 3113.01A) definition of engagement as being too vague.²⁴ The manual states that peacetime military engagement is

*“All military activities involving other nations that are intended to shape the theater security environment in peacetime.”*²⁵

while shaping is defined in the National Military Strategy as the ,

*“element of our strategy that helps foster institutions and international relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and threats; and deterring aggression and coercion.”*²⁶

The RAND study asserts that, although engagement is critical to the military strategy, it contributes to more than just shaping.²⁷ Further, these definitions fall short in providing a construct for tying their function to a specific purpose, as is done in the deliberate planning process. The challenge of rethinking theater strategies in terms of the new security environment is facilitated by viewing engagement tasks along a spectrum of activity that is tied to either opportunities or threats. In this conceptual framework, the CJCS definition is clarified by breaking down engagement activities into one of four categories. The task categories in the engagement spectrum are:

²⁴ Brown, Roger, Lewis, Leslie, Schrader, John. *Improving Support to CINC Theater Engagement Plans*. (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation National Defense Research Institute, 2001)

²⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning (CJCSM 3113.01A)*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), GL-6.

²⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C., 1997), 7.

- Enhancement – activities intended to further existing security relationships in preserving international or regional stability and security. NATO exercises are an example of enhancement type engagement.
- Enlargement – activities intended to expand or create new security relationships in order to preserve international or regional stability and security. Partnership for Peace initiatives and confidence building measures are examples of enlargement type engagement.
- Deterrence – activities intended to deter aggression in the prevention of regional conflicts to preserve regional stability. Global Naval presence is an example of deterrent type engagement.
- Coercion – activities intended to coerce potential combatants through peaceful means to prevent or reduce existing regional conflicts and restore regional stability. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Teams are an example of coercive type engagement.

Generally, enhancement and enlargement leverage opportunities in the security environment thereby indirectly reducing threats, while deterrence and coercion intend to reduce threats directly thereby indirectly increasing opportunity. The Engagement Spectrum framework introduces an objective basis for relating engagement activity to security environment. Figure 1 illustrates the Engagement Spectrum Framework.

²⁷ Brown, Roger, Lewis, Leslie, Schrader, John. *Improving Support to CINC Theater Engagement Plans*. (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation National Defense Research Institute, 2001)




Figure 1. Engagement Spectrum Framework

As discussed, the national strategic guidance that governed development of the CINC's existing Theater Engagement Strategic Concept documents was keyed to an opportunity based assessment of the global security environment. Threat reduction was either done indirectly, through opportunity based engagement, or directly through responding to threats and crises.²⁸ Therefore, as one would expect from this conceptual framework, Theater Engagement Plans based on this guidance have comprised largely enhancement and enlargement type activities. This point is validated in the existing JSCP documents where, NATO enlargement and Partnership for Peace initiatives were top priority regional objectives while Foreign Internal Defense tasks were all but eliminated from the prioritized objective list.²⁹

Because the global security environment has changed, Theater Engagement Strategic Concepts must be amended to broaden their scope from focusing on opportunity based enhancement and enlargement activities to a full spectrum engagement strategy that prioritizes threat based deterrent and coercive activities. The critical nature of the engagement mission

²⁸ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), 2-3.

²⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JCSP 3110.01B)* Washington, D.C., 1998, Enclosure E.

suggests that this should be done now rather than waiting for the biennial review requirement not due until April of 2003.³⁰

Practical Hypothesis: Prioritized Regional Objectives and the Inter-agency

The process for determining CINC generated regional engagement strategies and Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs) resulted from the desire of the National Command Authority to develop globally integrated theater engagement activities that are tied to the National Security and Military Strategy.³¹ The TEP process consists of four phases that comprise initiation, strategic concept development, plan development, and plan review.³² Utilizing the full spectrum engagement model keyed to the existing security environment has practical implications on the Theater Engagement Strategy and Planning Process in two specific areas. First, it affects the determination of Prioritized Regional Objectives in the CINC's Theater Engagement Strategic Concept document. And second, it necessitates improvement in inter-agency coordination as a result of the nature of engagement activities required to meet those revised objectives.

Rethinking Prioritized Regional Objectives

The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINC's with planning guidance via the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) document.³³ The CPG translates directly into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) tasking to the CINC. Priority Regional Objective guidance is contained in both of these documents. Of course, the ideal engagement strategy would take maximum advantage of the opportunities

³⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning (CJCSM 3113.01A)*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), A-1.

³¹ Jordan, Lovelace, Young, *"Shaping" the World Through "Engagement": Assessing the Department of Defense's Theater Engagement Planning Process*, (Newport, R.I.: United States Naval War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2000)

³² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning (CJCSM 3113.01A)*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), A-2.

present in the security environment while minimizing threats. However, as in all strategy making, it is scarcity of resources that forces hard choices. In the resource constrained environment of Theater Engagement Planning, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan facilitates decision making by delineating Prioritized Regional Objectives as such,

Tier 1: Vital

Tier 2: Important

Tier3: Lesser Important³⁴

The implications for Theater Engagement Strategy Concepts, based on the shift in focus necessitated by September 11th, is that more deterrent and coercion activities must be assigned Tier 1 priority while enhancement and enlargement activities may transition to Tier 2 or 3 as available engagement resources dwindle. This tradeoff in prioritized objectives, as a practical impact caused by September 11th should manifest itself in the release of upcoming strategic guidance, and specifically in the CPG, JSCP and CINC's Theater Engagement Strategic Concepts. A graphical representation of the effect of September 11th's impact on Prioritized Regional Objectives is shown in Figure 2.

³³ Ibid., A-2.

³⁴ Jordan, Lovelace, Young, *"Shaping" the World Through "Engagement": Assessing the Department of Defense's Theater Engagement Planning Process*, (Newport, R.I.: United States Naval War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2000)




Figure 2. Effect of Security Environment on Prioritized Regional Objectives

Enhancing Inter-agency Coordination

A second practical impact follows directly from the first. Transitioning from an opportunity prioritized engagement strategy, rich with enhancement and enlargement activities, to a threat prioritized engagement strategy that focuses on deterrence and coercion fundamentally changes the types of engagement activities that will dominate the TEP. For example, activities such as exercise coordination with new host countries, covert intelligence gathering across government agencies and foreign internal defense initiatives are all applicable to pro-active

homeland defense, and are therefore likely to be assigned higher priority in updated strategic concepts. The impact is seen in the amount of inter-agency coordination required to execute the strategy. The nature of these activities necessitates close coordination among multiple government agencies, much more so than simply repeating annual “military to military” allied exercises with whom host nation support has long been arranged. Since there is no formal mechanism for facilitating inter-agency coordination in the TEP process,³⁵ an effective strategic concept must concern itself with how to enable intra-theater inter-agency liaison. An inter-agency coordination mechanism similar to that used in the deliberate planning process, as prescribed by JOPES Volume II, is a good place to start. Additionally, critical agencies and Departments such as Central Intelligence, State, and the newly formed Office of Homeland Defense, could facilitate the coordination process by being formally involved in the development of the CPG and Enclosure E to the JSCP which sets initial Prioritized Regional Objectives for engagement.³⁶ Finally, when the Joint Staff reviews the plans in phase IV of the process, analyzing to ensure that they are consistent with the overarching guidance, and then integrating them into an approved "Global Family of Plans"³⁷, further opportunity is available here to ensure that inter-agency and departmental coordination is optimized. While the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy reviews the family of plans for consistency with the established priorities of other Government Agencies and Departments,³⁸ there is no evidence in the formal guidance that obliges even a cursory review by other agencies.

³⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning (CJCSM 3113.01A)*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), A-2.

³⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (CJCSM 3110.01B)* Washington, D.C., 1998, Enclosure E.

³⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning (CJCSM 3113.01A)*, (Washington, D.C., 2000), A-1.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, A-3.

Rethinking Theater Engagement requires that these two issues, reordering of prioritized regional objectives and improved inter-agency coordination, be addressed in order that theater engagement can best serve to maximize its relevance across all vital national interests including homeland defense.

Conclusion: The End of “Benign Hegemony”

Former National Security Advisor Mr. Sandy Berger once characterized the United States as the "benign hegemon". His statement captures well the world-view of the Clinton Administration as it is expressed in their National Security and Military Strategies. It also evidences why theater engagement strategies resulting from the strategic guidance in these documents prioritized enhancement and enlargement of existing security relationships, and contained comparatively less emphasis on deterrent and coercive peacetime activity. The impact of September 11th on the global security environment evidences a need to rethink theater engagement across the full spectrum of engagement activities and revise it to meet a more challenging and threatening world. If anything, United States military engagement abroad is more relevant than it was before September, but its scope and focus need revision. The realities of today's security environment render the expression “benign hegemony” an oxymoron. September 11th presented the United States with a mandate to lead. Forward, robust, and full spectrum military engagement is an imperative element in satisfying that mandate.

Recommendations:

A summary of recommendations, as output of this analysis, follows:

- Theater Engagement Strategy should be formulated recognizing the conceptual framework of full spectrum engagement keyed to the emergent global security environment.
- Although the Chairman's Manual for Theater Engagement Planning (CJCSM 3113.01A) states that Strategic Concept documents are not due for revision until April of 2003, revised Theater Strategic Concepts should be submitted prior to required activity annex revision this October. The Strategic Concepts should reflect full spectrum engagement with regional objectives prioritized for pro-active homeland defense.
- Opportunity based engagement remains a critical element of a full spectrum engagement strategy. It should continue, but receive a lower priority than those engagement activities designed to target terrorism and WMD proliferation directly.
- The TEP process should be amended to *formally* include other critical agencies and departments at three specific points in the process. First, they should be involved in the prioritization of regional objectives, second in the formulation of theater strategic concept documents, and finally in the review of the global family of plans.

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